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PROBLEMS OF COMPUTING THE DAMAGES
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
Nishant Kumar Singh*
Srishti Jha*
INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of natural law has come a long way from the days of the
ancient Stoics to the era of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Natural
rights tend to renew their form age after age, resounding the voice of the living
and protesting individual, for whose sake all political games are played and all
governments executed. I Our Constitution embodies these principles in the form of
Fundamental Rights. Also, significantly, Art. 142 of our Constitution enjoins the
courts to do "complete justice".
The Court has also taken cognisance of Article 9(5)2 of the International
Covenant on Ci vii and Political Rights, 1966 which provides for enforceable right
to remedy for the violation of fundamental right of the people.3 Constitutional
torts were originally conceived as disabilities placed on the State.4 The damage
remedy for constitutional remedies is, in fact, a recent innovation of the Irish5 and
American" law-systems. In the present scenario, it is the compensation question,
which is of looming importance.
*

II Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University, Bangalore.

I

J. Waldron, The Theory of Rights. 21 (1985).

2

Article 9(5) of ICCPR reads as under:
"Anyone who has been victim of unlawful arrest or detention shall have enforceable right to
compensation."

3

See Punjab and Haryana Bar Association v. State of Punjab. (1983) 4 SCC 141.

4

R. Ramachandran,

5

See generally J. Cassey, Constitutional Law in Ireland, (1988), J.M. Kelly, The Irish Constitution (2nd. ed, 1984). See also T. Kerr & T.Cooley, "Constitutional Aspects ofIrish Tort Law".
3 Dublin Univ. L.J. I (1981). See also W. Binchy, Constitutional Remedies and the Law of
Torts in J .0. Reilley (ed.), Constitutional Remedies and the Law of Torts: Essays ill Honour of
Brian Walsh 201 (1992), Meskell II Cie. 1973 IR 121, Kennedy & Arnold v. Ireland, 1987 IR87
(here, an unjustified phone tap was redressed with damages.)

6

See generally Sheldon H. Nahmod, "Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice. A Different View", 76 Va. L. Rev. 997 (1990) See also Andrew S. Butler, "Constitutional Rights in

Constitutional Torts, The Lawyers, 16 (April, 1998).

PrivateLitigation:A Critiqueand ComparativeAnalysis".16 Anglo-Am.L. Rev. 1 (1993),
M.M. Egan, "Constitutional Civil Law", 31 Mercer L. Rev. 885 (1980); C. Whitman, "Constitutional Torts", 79 Mich. L. Rev. 5, 22 (1980); F. M. McClellan and P. H. North Cross,
"Remedies and Damages for the Violation of Constitutional Right", 18 Duq. L. Rev. 409 (1980).
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Judicial pronouncements have removed the age-old doctrine of sovereign
immunity.? It is for the meaningful realisation of these values that the notion of
constitutional tort" is becoming increasingly popular in Indian jurisprudence.R
Why compensation, one may ask? Is it not making a mockery of the lofty
ideals of constitutional rights, is it not making way for a ruthless market where
rights can be bought and sold by the government? Even assuming, that compensation does make constitutional rights more meaningful, what is supposed to be the
yardstick of awarding damages? What standard should be adhered to by courts, in
fixing a monetary sum for a concept as sacred and intangible, as "rights"?
That the punishment imposed is variable on the purpose it is supposed to
serve is well known. In this section, we examine the various theories put forward
by modern jurists in the realm of constitutional torts.
In this article, we critically evaluate the functioning of Indian courts in awarding damages, which arise out of constitutional tort. In addition, doubts have been
expressed as to the efficacy of damages as a constitutional remedy.
EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS IN THE INDIAN
CONTEXT
Interestingly, the "State-pays" principle, if one can call it that, was not altogether alien to ancient Indian jurists. Despite monarchy, India of yore seems to
have had a highly developed system of public justice. In Manu's words "One
quarter of the guilt of an unjust decision, falls on the King".9 However, probably
the first seeds of the constitutional contemporary constitutional torts regime, were
sown in the celebrated case of Rudul Sah v. Union of India, 10 when an illegally
detained person was awarded a monetary award from the State Exchequer.
Of course, the old rule of sovereign immunity has died a natural death and
the enthusiasm of the courts to do "complete justice" under Article 142 of the
Constitution, II is accompanied by a studied silence on a vital aspect of constitutional torts: the pricing of this compensation.

7

Dr. R.e. Jha, Fundamental Rights and the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, (1st ed. 1995).

8

See generally, P.K. Tripathi, Article 32 and Compensation Conundrum, 2

9

See J!enerally, P.N. Sen, An Introduction to Hindu Jurisprudence, (1984).

10 (1983) 4

see

see (1) 51 (1984).

141.

11 See generally, Union Carbide v. Union of India, (1991) 4 see 584 and Indian Council ofEnviroLegal Action v. Union of India, (1996) 3 see 212.
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CONCEPTUAL

It is indeed a tough calling to put a price tag on fundamental rights. In 1998,
D. K. Basu case constitutional bench held that "there is no straightjacket formula
of computation of the damages". 12 An analysis of the approach of the Court will
clarify the matter.
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These cases illustrate the inconsistency and uncertainty of the courts in their
approach. In fact, in the case of Kalawati v. State of Himachal Pradeshl7 the Motor Vehicles Act was resorted to for computation of costs, while on another occasion,18 a' Criminal Injuries Compensation Board has been set up to resolve the issue.
12 Infra, n. 16, p. 443; In Ireland too, there have been difficulties in estimating costs in monetary
terms. Dicta suggests that only nominal damages are possible in constitutional torts because of
the problems involved in computing costs of fundamental rights infringed. The touchstone of
"supreme and fundamental importance" was used in Conway v. Irish National Teachers Organisation, (1991) ILRM 497. The eourt was inclined to award punitive damages for the constitutional rights infringed.
13

(1983) 4 see

141.

14

(1984) I see

339.

IS

1984 (Supp) see

16

(1997) I see

416.

17

(1996) I see

490.

504.

18 Delhi Domestic Working Womens Forum v. Union of India. (1995) I see

14.
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TORTS:

(A) Importing Common Law Principles in Measuring the Damages
(Common Law Model)
The use of the word "compensation" in constitutional torts cases, necessarily
imports common law principles.19 The damage awarded by the court in this particular approach would be in proportion to the injuries established.20 To put it
more simply, more the injuries, the more the damage. However in the constitutionallaw cases more often than not it is not possible to establish the consequential injuries as a result of the violation of the fundamental right.21Therefore, the
plaintiff can get some nominal damages only, which is highly insufficient.22 This
paradigm doesn't allow damages to be recovered solely for the loss of a right even one protected by the constitution - in the absence of consequential injury.23
The Apex Court in the D. K. Basu case has again fallen into the same trap. The
Court held that in the assessment of the compensation, the emphasis has to be on
the compensatory and not on the primitive element.24 This myopic view of the
Court may lead to a situation where the citizen is deprived of his entitlement to
damages by the wooden application of common law defences. It may be grimly
noted that where the common law model has been applied, courts have refused to
grant general compensatory damages when the citizen has failed to establish the
consequential injuries.25Where insufficient proof to establish such injury has been

19 See generally Note, "Damage Awards for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey
v. Piphus", 93 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1980).
20

See Cooper Stevenson, "Tort Theory for the Charter Damage Remedy", 52 Saketchewan L. Rev.
1, 85 (1988); see also H.P. Monaghan, "The Supreme Court 1974 term: Foreward: Constitutional Common Law", 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1,2-3, (1975); T. S. Schrock and R. C. Welsh, "Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law", 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1117 (1978).

21

Both Constitutional tort law and ordinary tort law are an uneasy amalgam of regulation and
compensation. That is, both regimes share an instrumental concern to inhibit to undesirable
conduct and a non-instrumental desire to compensate injured persons. In Constitutional tort
law, at least, the regulatory aspect predominates. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., "Damages for Constitutional Violations: the Relation of Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts", 75 Va. L. Rev. 1461
(1989).

22

See W.M. Smith, "Damages or Nothing: The Efficacy of the Biven Types Remedy", 64 Cornell
L. Rev. 667, 693-697 (1979).

23

See T.A. Eaton, "Causation in the Constitutional Torts", 67 Iowa L. Rev. 443, 444 (1982).

24

Supra, n. 16, p. 443 (para. 54).

25

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. (1978).
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offered, courts either have refused to grant 'general compensatory damages' or
have provided a nominal award.26
B. The Voting Right Model
The voting right model has emerged from the common right model as an
exception. This model is entirely based upon the conceptual understanding of compensation awarded in the event of the infringement of the right to vote. Under this
particular model there is no necessity to establish that there was actual injury sustained due to violation of right.27 The fact that the plaintiff's constitutional right
has been infringed is sufficient to imply that irreversible damage has occurred.
This approach envisages a presumption that the mere infringement of the constitutional right attracts punitive damage. Significantly, in this model, the only burden
which has been placed on the plaintiff, is to prove that there was violation of his
constitutional right. Additionally, he has not been burdened with establishing that
he got some kind of consequential injuries. Courts have laid down the interesting
and significant proposition of the law in the case of the infringement of the right to
vote cases where it has observed that "this (right to vote) constitutional right is so
valuable that damages are presumedfrom the wrongful deprivation of it without
evidence of the actual loss. 28
This approach was canvassed by the Indian Supreme Court in Shim Singh
case where the court considered the infringement of the right to vote and awarded
compensation for the same. Here, what is important to note is that compensation
was given without taking into consideration the consequential injury he received.
The infringement of the right to vote per se would not have changed the result of
the election and thus no injury as such could be established. But the court granted
damages of Rs. 50,000/-, considering the fact the constitutional rights are so valuable that their mere violation attracts the remedy of compensation.

26

"Damage Award for Constitutional Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus", 93 Harv.
L. Rev. 966, 968 (1980).

27

Supra, n. 26, p. 968.

28

Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64 (8th cir. 1919): the principle laid down in this case law was
recognised and followed in Tautam v. Mortam, 562 F.2d 1279; where the appellate court reversed the reasoning of the district court and noticeably observed that:
"The right to demonstration is a significant strand of the cluster of the First Amendment rights.
The vindication of these rights warrants more than token acknowledgement.. .. Compensatory
damages embrace more than recompense for monetary injury .... It is in the public interest that
there will be a reasonably spacious approach to a fair compensatory award for denial or the
curtailment of the right to demonstrates".
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C. Evolving a New Approach

The use of "compensation" in constitutional law litigation is by itself misleading and irresponsible. Thus we see that the common law right model by itself is
highly inadequate because it doesn't provide redress for the infringement of the
fundamental right only.29The victim mayor may not have suffered consequential
damage, but he has suffered interference with his Constitutional rights since enforcement depends on private action, it may be important (if effective enforcement is desired) to provide some incentive to an aggrieved individual to act as
private prosecutor.30In Constitutional tort litigation, damages must be employed as
a constitutional rather than a common law remedy. If an individual will not recover
the damages unless he establishes that the infringement of his right resulted in
some consequential injuries, it is less likely that infringement of the constitutional
rights will be perused in the court.3J In these cases, Constitution may have been
breached with impunity. Therefore, the sole focus on the common law approach
wouldn't serve the purpose in Constitution litigation. We need to envisage the voting right model as well. Common law principles could work as set of principles in
determining the award of damages but the guiding principle must be the voting
right model which ensures compensation for interference in fundamental rights.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND METHOD
OF COMPUTATION
The voting right model chiefly envisages punitive damages. Punitive damages
are awarded in addition to the compensatory and nominal damages. It primarily
performs penal and deterrent functions. In addition, when they are awarded in
conjunction with general compensatory or nominal damages, they also perform a
vindicatory function.32
In almost every case, Indian courts have opted for awarding exemplary (punitive) damages, but they have awarded it on an ad hoc, case to case basis. There
is no application of rational and coherent principles for computation of damages.
The economic basis33 of awarding the punitive damage is that an injurer has a
29

See generally Marylin L. Pilkintona, "Damages as a Remedy for the Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms", 62 Can. Bar Rev. 5 I6 (1984).

30

See J.c. Love, "Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights", 67 Calif. L.
Rev. 1242, 1263 (1979).

31

See c.P. Sustein, "Judicial Relief and Public Tort Law", 92 Yale L. 1. 749, 753 (1983).

32

See generally, Comment, "Constitutional Damages", 67 Calif. L. Rev. (1979).

33

This justification for punitive damages has been developed by Robert D. Cooter, "Economic
Analysis of Punitive Damages", 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79 (1982). See also David D. Haddock. Fred
S. McChesney & Mehnahem Spingel, "An ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary
Legal Sanctions", 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1(1990).
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chance of escaping the liability for the harm he causes.34 Therefore, when a
person causing injury has a chance of escaping liability, the proper level of total
damages to impose on him, if he is found liable, is the harm caused multiplied of
being found liable.35 No doubt, this entire mathematical matrix proceeds on the
assumption of the probability of injurer escaping liability, we believe that Courts
often will be able to get enough information about the likelihood of escaping liability
to apply the theory reasonably. The multipliers,36in the table are derived as follows.
Let P be the probability of being found liable; thus, the probability of being escaping the liability is 1 - P. the multipliers then equals (1 - p)/p.37 Thus, on average,
the injurer will pay for the harm he causes and the appropriate deterrence will
result. Thus for example, if the harm is 1,00,000 and there is seventy percent
chance that the injurer will be found liable for the harm which he is legally responsible, the harm should be multiplied by 2.33, so the 'total damage' should be 2.33
lakh. Once the proper level of total damages is calculated in this way, punitive
damage can be determined by subtracting compensatory damages from the total.
In the example, because compensatory damage would equal the harm of 1,00,000;
'punitive damage' would equal 1.33 lakh (2.33 - 1) lakh.
Table for Possible Multiplier
Probability of Escaping Liability
0%

Punitive Damage Multiplier
o

10%

0.11

20%

0.25

30%

0.43

40%

0.67

50%

1.00

60%

1.50

70%

2.33

80%

4.00

90%

9.00

34

The first explicit reference to the factor of escaping the liability as ajustification for the punitive
damages apparently are Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 77-78 (1st ed., 1972).

35

See generally, A. Mitchell Polinsky and Stevens, "Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis",
III Harv. L. Rev. 869, 874 (1998).

36

Richard Craswell, "Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships", 25 J. Legal Stud. 463 (1996).

37

Supra n. 3, p. 962.
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CONCLUSION
That constitutional tort is here to stay undisputed. Its sphere keeps expanding
by the hour - a recent judgement has held that the Court can enforce even private
bodies or individuals to pay compensation if they violate the fundamental rights of
a citizen.38 In fact, the law of constitutional tort is being used as a potent weapon
by the judiciary to combat chronic societal evils. In M. C. Mehta v. State ofT.N.,39
an employer was forced to pay compensation to the tune of Rs. 5,000 per child he
illegally exploited as labour, which was considered to have violated their right to
life.
However, compensation is routinely celebrated but rarely decisive. The Indian courts need to arrive at a broad consensus as to the why's and how's of
constitutional torts, for very often, it is compensation that defines the right and not
vice versa. It is now clear that the common law model for computation of damages
is sadly ill equipped in the complex realm of public law. This is because the purpose of the remedy in the law of torts is different from its counterpart in constitutionallaw: common law principles can provide nothing more than a starting point
for constitutional tort law and not a complete solution.,,40
D.K. Basu's case has given out some confused signals about the assessment
of damages by disregarding the punitive element of damages. This mitigates against
deterrence, which, it must be remembered, is the chief goal of public law remedies. It is feared that a Pandora's box of common law defences may open up
which will trivialise the very ideal of fundamental rights. If the theory of damages
were constrained by it and the parameters of compensatory element, there would
not be any difference between the alternative remedy, which is efficaciously available in the civil law.
The advantage of having this kind of redressal remedy is that it causes
deterrence that helps in reducing the violation of fundamental rights. Another advantage of this remedy is that it is expeditious in nature because remedy that is
available under the torts through civil procedure code creates hassles. A victim if
he claims any damage, has to pay a considerable amount as court fee under the
Court Fees Act. This remedy which is available under the civil law is not economically viable for a poor victim who has already suffered lot of damage and this
might result in curtailment of their right to compensation.

38

Bodhisatwa Gautam v. Subhra Chakraborty, (1996) 1 SCC 4901.

39

(1996) 1 SCC 490.

40

See A.B. Chayes, ''The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation", 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281
(1976).
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To restore the "significant content",41 of Art. 21 and to mete out "complete
justice" as enshrined in Art. 142 of our Constitution, the restitutive function of
constitutional torts must be kept alive. In other words, Indian Courts must avoid the
trap of the common law model and concentrate more on the punitive element in the
computation of damages. The Law Commission of India in its "Ninety Second"
report proposed an amendment to enable an application for a claim for damages to
be joined in an application for judicial review before the High Court.42
However, it must be cautioned that over-activism on this front can have haphazard economic consequences. For one, the government might internalise the
costs of regular litigation. Secondly, it may paradoxically lead to a dilution of
rights, that is, due to reluctance to demand damages; the Court might narrow down
the ambit of fundamental rights themselves.43 But apprehension of a flood of litigation should in no way deter courts from meeting appropriate justice. The Constitution, by its very terms, embodies a choice to bear certain costs to vindicate
fundamental rights.

41

Supra, n. 13.

42 See Bharucha J" Soli J. Sorabji & Rajeev Dhavan, "Damages in Public Law", 13 The Lawyers
Collective 13 (1998).

43 See Jon O. Newman, "Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Enforcers'Misconduct",

87 Yale L. 1. 447 (1978).

